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Chapter One
Discovering the many Folds of Financial Inclusion
I.a Introduction
The recent literature has provided evidence on the groundbreaking role played by financial
inclusion in enhancing the wellbeing of households and economic growth. This end is realized
by enlarging access of the disadvantaged groups to basic financial services in the form of greater
use of formal bank accounts, savings, and loans. However, the literature has overlooked the
impact of the inclusive finance goal on the soundness of banks. In this respect, the suggested
research aims at testing the relationship between financial inclusion and bank‟s credit risk, hence
its stability. The findings in the literature suggest that banking stability is accomplished by
availing financial services to households and Small to Medium Size Enterprise (SME‟s). The
reason behind this is that it allows banks to diversify their credit portfolio, risk exposure, and
reduction of non-performing loans (NPLs) specially when the borrowers are SMEs. Another
positive feature is being a mechanism to lay down ample risk-free and cheap retail deposits. This
could be employed as a leeway to decrease the reliance on volatile and often costly money
market funding. An inclusive banking sector tends to have a higher level of cost and profit
efficiency.
The rising voices demanding for more inclusive finance have remained persistent since the early
2000‟s, and are a consequence of empirical findings that financial inclusion efforts have positive
effects on the alleviation of poverty in a country (Siddik & Kabiraj, 2018). In this respect,
governments and central banks around the globe started to take initiatives and adopted new
regulations to promote financial inclusion. Almost within the same time period, the recent global
crises in 2007-2009 has compelled the world economies to embrace the concept of financial
stability and emerge it as a policy priority (Siddik & Kabiraj, 2018).
Financial inclusion programs aim to provide greater opportunity of access for formal financial
services to the marginalized sectors of the community, which in turn foster economic
development of a country (Hannig & Jansen, 2010). In this light, focusing on the access and
usage dimension of financial inclusion, the former has been described as a course of action
which ensures, firstly, the access to the formal system and secondly, providing well-timed and

ample credit facilities to those in need for financial services including the weaker and the
disadvantaged people of the country (Khan, 2011).
Building on the access and usage aspect of financial inclusion, despite the fact that the
groundbreaking initiative can improve citizens‟ social standard, as given by the bank‟s capacity
to lend under the umbrella of financial inclusion to fund SME‟s and individuals‟ small
businesses. The research community has remained skeptical about the impact of financial
inclusion on banks' credit risk and hence their stability.
Financial stability is conceptualized as the situation in which a financial system, consisting of
financial markets, financial intermediaries, and market infrastructures is able to resist financial
shocks, which are able to ruin the distribution of savings to lucrative investment alternatives.
This would also mean, that financial stability is strongly allied to the risk diminution to the least
intensity and resistance to shocks. Moreover, the concept of financial stability is likely to differ
from developed to developing economies. In developed economies, financial stability is
interpreted in the context of the state of non-financial institutions such as retirement funds,
brokerage houses, investments funds, etc. Whereas in developing economies that comprise
undeveloped stock markets, insurance companies, and investments into those countries mostly
relying on bank loans. Henceforth, banks are the key pillars of financial stability and the gateway
to economic stability (Popovska,2014).

I.b Objectives of the Study
Bearing in mind the virtues of financial inclusion and its ultimate goal in improving humanity's
living standards. The goal that could be achieved by the delivery of financial services such as
offerings loans to the underserved segment of the community, hence realizing suggested
stability. Past contributions to the literature have overlooked the impact of introducing new
customers to the official financial institutions by availing loans on banks' stability in specific and
the entire national economy in general, making the outcomes yet ambiguous. In this regard, this
study shall examine the impact of financial inclusion on banks credit risk in the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) region. In the light of having two opposing teams in the literature, the
suggested research shall establish some answers to whether financial inclusion can positively or
negatively impact the banks credit risk and hence stability.

I.c Contribution to the Literature
This thesis contributes to the current and relevant literature as follows:
1. Past literature has covered areas pertaining to the expansion of loans to clients and the
case of imprudent loan extension impact on the quality of lending standards.
Furthermore, it highlighted aspects of non-performing loans and how they vary in
respect to the amount of loans provided to the end customers and banks' management.
The relevant literature has also covered cases where credit has been extended under
financial inclusion programs and how banking products' diversification can reduce risk,
thus, resulting in stability. However, this thesis shall contribute to the literature by
identifying the impact of and the relationship between the most relevant financial
inclusion indicators extracted from the World Bank's Financial inclusion database
(FINDEX) and the credit risk illustrated by the ratio of the provision of loan losses to net
loans.
2. The thesis shall also inform financial regulators on how long till financial inclusion starts
to take effect on credit risk.

Chapter Two
Financial Inclusion and Banks’ Credit Risk: Review of Relevant
Literature
II.a Conceptualizing Financial Inclusion in the Context of Previous Finance
Theories
Financial inclusion can be understood in the context of the finance growth theory. It creates a
conducive ground for productivity and hence economic growth. According to Spratt (2013),
realizing economic growth depends on the level of financial inclusion, composition, and stability
of the financial intuitions. The increased demand for financial services cause the financial
markets to evolve from a nascent economy. Henceforth, deepening financial inclusion is an
illustration of growth in other sectors of the economy and for financial institutions to support
financial inclusion, they must be financial stable.
The effect of financial inclusion on bank credit risk has also been explained in context of
Akerlof‟s financial asymmetry theory (1970). Boffondi and Gobbi (2003), perceive adverse
selection to occur when a lender cannot differentiate between borrowers of different risks when
loan contracts are limited. This leads to borrowers repaying loans when they have the mean to do
so, triggering the accumulation of non-performing loans (Boffondi & Gobbi, 2003). Hanning and
Jansen (2010) characterize financial inclusion by the entry of new, inexperienced and numerous
customers into the formal financial sector including commercial banks. This creates an obstacle
in the debt markets, as lenders have difficulties in deciding whether the customer is a good risk
which menaces financial performance and hence stability. Therefore, it is challenging for banks
to establish whether financial inclusion is a low risk good investment or otherwise (Hanning &
Jansen, 2010). According to Richard (2011), moral hazard and adverse selection resulting from
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders can instigate contraction in credit and
hence affecting performance and stability. Moral hazard occurs when a party to a transaction
provides misleading information about its assets, liabilities or credit capacity. This is noted to be
contributing to non-performing loans.

The theory by Diamond (1984) on financial intermediation has been deployed to establish a link
between financial inclusion and bank credit risk. Diamond explains that banks act as
intermediaries between borrowers and savers. As financial middlemen, banks avail access,
financial diversification, and financial utilization. The degree of inclusion has an influence on the
level of stability as substantiated by the literature. Diamond also points out that banks are able to
effectively monitor borrowers and thus play the role of delegated monitoring. Reducing
monitoring costs have significant impact on competitive advantage. Ndebbio (2004) regards
financial intermediation as the extent to which financial institutions bring deficit spending units
and surplus spending units together.

II.b Financial Inclusion Concept from Opponents to Advocates
The literature on the relationship between financial inclusion and banks' credit risk is scarce and
presents mixed evidence. Some scholars have concluded a negative influence of financial
inclusion on banks' riskiness, while other have reached results supporting the positivity of
financial inclusion on banks' risk and stability. These mixed results incent researchers to further
explore and reach robust answers on the nature of this relationship.
Commenting on aspects of banks' management, Espinoza and Prasad (2010) found that
promoting size increase in loans can have a lagged effect on non-performing loans. This makes it
difficult for bank managers to deal with the repercussions of credit risk in time (Espinoza &
Prasad, 2010). Louzis, Vouldis and Metaxas (2012) have delivered a view of bank determinants.
They concluded that non-performing loans are significantly promoted by the quality of bank
management (Louzis et al., 2012). Gosh (2015) has referred to the strong relationship between
the liquidity of risk, asset size, and cost efficiency of the banking sector and non-performing
loans, which would be affected by social factors (Gosh,2015). Based on a study conducted in
China, Guan, Zheng, HU, Fang and Ren (2017) analyzed the relationship between nonperforming loans and the carbon intensity of loans according to China‟s environment protection
strategy and sought the results that prove that green credit would add to the credit risk of banks
and hence increase non-performing loans (Guan et al., 2017)
In regards to availing credit and loan expansions, Khan (2011) has cited that financial inclusion
can contribute negatively to financial stability. This can occur by attempting to expand the pool
of borrowers that leads to the degradation of lending standards. It is worth to recall that this was

a major contributor to the severity of the “subprime” crisis in the United States (Khan,2011).
Khan also argues that banks could increase their reputational risk if they outsource various
functions as credit assessment in order to reach smaller borrowers. Moreover, if micro finance
institutions are not properly regulated, an increase in lending by that group can dilute the overall
effectiveness of regulation in the economy and intensify financial systems' risks (Khan, 2011).
Merhotra and Yetman (2015) argue that under the condition of high-paced and reckless credit
expansion, higher financial inclusion leads to uncertainty for financial stability. This growth
norm of unfettered parts of the country‟s financial system may further weaken the stability of
regulated financial systems (Merhotra & Yetman, 2015).
Sahay, Cihak, N'Diaye, Barajas, Mitram, Kyobe, Mooi and Youssefi (2015) observe a negative
impact of financial inclusion on financial stability. The authors argue that with the lack of
proper supervision, when credit is expanded to all, an increase in the risk of financial stability
will be witnessed (Sahay et al., 2015). Furthermore, financial safeguards deteriorate when access
to credit increases. They degrade more rapidly in countries with poor banking supervision. In
contrast, states with strong supervision could observe the benefits of financial stability from this
higher access to credit (Sahay et al, 2015).
Advocating for the concept of financial inclusion, Hanning and Jansen (2010) argue that low
income groups are immune to economic cycles. Thus, including them in the financial sector will
likely raise the stability of the deposit and loan basis. They invoke anecdotal evidence suggesting
that financial institutions that serve customers on the lower end tend to endure macro-crisis and
sustain the local economic activity (Hanning & Jansen, 2010).
Khan (2011) suggests that deciding to diversify banks' assets as a result of increased lending to
smaller firms can decrease the overall riskiness of a bank loan‟s portfolio. This means that the
size of a single borrower will be reduced in the overall portfolio and reduce its volatility
(Khan,2011).
Furthermore. Khan (2011) advances three core approaches through which financial inclusion can
have a positive impact on financial stability. The first approach is by increasing the amount of
credit to SME‟s, banks can diversify their investment portfolio which in turn would reduce the
overall riskiness of the banks. Secondly, financial inclusion means allowing the entry of more

small savers to the financial system. By inducting this segment to the financial sector, the deposit
volume and its stability would rise and diminish the reliance on non-core financing, which has a
deteriorating impact in times of financial catastrophe. This reflects in a decline of procyclical
uncertainty. The third approach, is that financial inclusion may well reflect to an improved
monetary policy through which financial stability goal could be achieved (Khan, 2011).
Han and Melecky (2013), use the data from 90 countries to examine the link between financial
inclusion and financial stability. The authors have observed that financial inclusion measured by
wider access and use of deposits, can build stronger banks' deposit base in the period of financial
trauma. This will aid in the stability of a country‟s financial sector, especially middle income
countries (Han & Melecky, 2013). Morgan and Pointes (2014), find that financial inclusion
measured by proportion of credit provided to small and medium sized enterprises, enhances
stability in the financial system (Morgan & Pointes, 2014).
In an effort to define more determinants of non-performing loans, researchers shifted their focus
on factors from a macroeconomic perspective. In other words, referring to the regional economic
development and the established economic theories. Beck, Jakubik and Piloiu (2015), deploy a
number of national samples to analyze the influence of macroeconomic factors on nonperforming loans, and found that real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, stock prices,
exchange rates, and interest rates greatly decrease the scale of non-performing loans, while the
negative effect of the stock is stronger in developed countries (Beck et al., 2015).

II.c Non Performing Loans (NPLs)
Bhattarai (2015) in his study on the determinants of NPLs in Nepalese commercial banks, has
cited that the real effective exchange rate has a strong positive impact on the NPL's level and that
growth in real GDP had a reverse relationship with NPLs (Bhattarai, 2015). However, banks' size
and inflation are not crucial determinants of NPLs. According to another study conducted in
Greece, lending rates, real GDP growth rate, unemployment rate and public debt were considered
as the explanatory variables that have an impact on the NPLs' levels (Bhattarai, 2015). Other
banks' variables have an impact on the alteration of NPLs performance metrics as illustrated by
return on equity (ROE), banks efficiency demonstrated by the ratio of operating expenses and
operating income, and loans' categories (Bhattarai, 2015). NPLs are found to be determined by
the GDP growth rate, real interest rates and lenient credit terms. The latter can create a herd

behavior and agency problems that may incent bank managers to allow excessive lending during
boom periods. It is also being found that banks' lending policy could have a crucial influence on
NPLs (Bhattarai, 2015).
Kjosevski and Petkovski (2017) has reported that measuring credit quality can be conducted
using several indicators such as NPLs or defaults rates. However, NPLs has been used as a
measure of credit quality as it has more popularity in the relative literature (Kjosevski &
Petkovski, 2017). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), NPLs is the best
indicator for showing the quality of loan portfolio. The authors believe that a slowdown in
economic activity is likely to increase the growth of NPLs. They have also cited that a rapid
growth of credit can detriment loan performance, due to soft-loan constraints and
macroeconomic overheating. Higher concentration in banking usually accords higher NPLs.
In the context of procyclicality theory, a strong economic growth and decelerating NPLs ratio to
picture loan quality portfolio could be interpreted as a sign of economic overheating, hence a
potential threat to banking performance. The authors also allude to a study conducted on few
Baltic states, which found that GDP growth has a significant determinant of NPLs. Furthermore,
after the introduction of the real estate market growth rate as an explanatory variable, the former
played an important role in Latvia and Lithuania.
The authors reference a study where NPLs varies due to a negative correlation with GDP growth
in the Baltic states and Romania. The inflation rate exhibited a negative correlation with NPLs in
all countries except Lithuania. The lending interest rate has demonstrated a positive correlation
with NPLs in all countries except Romania. Likewise, for unemployment that has positively
correlated with the NPLs in all countries. (Kjosevski & Petkovski, 2017)
Kumarasinghe (2017) has mentioned the relationship of banks losses due to credit risk as an
effect of the evolution of the business cycle. The outcome confirms that banks' loan loss
provisions and new bad debt are affected by the evolution of the business cycle (Kumarasinghe,
2017). In this respect, during economic boom, banks' loans increase rapidly and credit expansion
decrease significantly in the depression cycle (Kumarasinghe, 2017). On the contrary, in times of
depression, the banks are reluctant to extend credit for the end of investment, hence reducing the
lending growth in the economy (Kumarasinghe, 2017). It is also found that when capital surplus
over the regulatory minimum is low, banks are more inclined to reduce lending, negatively

affecting the output of the economy (Kumarasinghe, 2017). As previously demonstrated, NPLs
lower level during boom is affected by high revenues of borrowers securing a stable cash flow to
meet their loans obligations. The opposite side would be that the growth of NPLs in times of
depression is caused by the fall in value of collaterals, hence incapable of covering the
outstanding balance in case of default (Kumarasinghe, 2017).

II.d Financial inclusion credit risk
One of the goals of financial inclusion is to allow individuals and entities to acquire loans.
However, with the propagation of loans as a mean of increasing the underserved segments influx
into the official financial sector, the former is confronted with potential default levels, leading to
the increase of Non-performing loans. This could be economically counter-productive, hence,
compelling banks‟ management to control this risk. In this respect, this part is set to cover means
in the past literature pertaining to decreasing the risk produced from loans acquisition under the
umbrella of financial inclusion.
II.d.1 Micro Finance and Banking Practices to Control Credit Risk
Mckernan (2002), has cited the Grameen Bank model in lending to the underserved segment of
the population. Microcredit programs approach poverty alleviation in a two-tiered approach, they
deliver credit to the poor for the purchase of capital input with the end in mind to promote
productive self-employment (McKernan, 2002). Moreover, they also provide non-credit services
that are known as social development programs such as vocation trainings, civil responsibilities
and rights, information in the area of health, and information sharing and monitoring among
members. These non-credit services that distinguish group lending programs from banks or
individual lending institutions, may be an element of success of micro-credit programs and thus a
critical element to maintain when expanding and replicating programs (McKernan, 2002).
Godquin (2004) perceives a join liability through peer selection, monitoring, and pressure to
enhance repayment rates' performance (Godquin, 2004). Besides, social ties and group
homogeneity are also expected to increase repayment performance through a greater efficiency
because of group dynamics (Godquin, 2004). The author believes that group homogeneity
resulting from effective peer selection as a mean to increase peer monitoring should positively
influence higher repayment rates (Godquin, 2004). High ties should have the same influence
because they ease peer monitoring and increase social sanction of peer pressure. The author also

adds, that dynamic incentives and the employment of non-financial services, which are
innovative microfinance not based on group lending, are also expected to increase repayment
performance (Godquin, 2004). Dynamic incentives are said to be used when microfinance
institutions increase the amount of lending to certain borrowers as credit is renewed, and
condition the allocation of new loans to previous repayment behavior. Some microfinance
programs are known as credit plus, as they provide services such as health services or adult
literacy. It may also include other trainings that go beyond financial services (Godquin, 2004).
According to Ibtissem and Bouri (2013), moral hazard, adverse selection, small transaction sizes,
amongst others, restrict the banking capacity to lend profitably to poor customers (Ibtissem &
Bouri, 2013). The failure of commercial banking and the exclusion of poor borrowers, that
originally one of the most important beneficiaries of the developmental purpose of financial
inclusion, raise question on how poor people can improve their situation (Ibtissem & Bouri,
2013).
In this respect, the authors have reported in their publication several mechanisms that allow
microfinance institutions to generate high repayment rates from borrowers without the need for
collaterals and group lending contracts (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). The first mechanism is the
threat of not to refinance a borrower who defaults on obligations. This will have a huge impact
on the borrowers‟ behaviors as they consider future loans to develop their business. The credible
threat to suspend future lending when loans are not satisfied, can be exploited to overcome
information problems (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013).
Another mechanism used to reduce lending risks and defaults is to establish a collateral
substitute that could act as an emergency fund (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). Following the Grameen
Bank model, many microfinance institutions, at the initial phase of their operations, require
borrowers to pay extra 0.5% of every unit borrowed. This emergency fund functions as an
insurance against loan default, death, or disability (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). Ibtissem and Bouri
have also cited Bank Rakyat Indonesia that uses the borrower‟s degree certificate, driver‟s
license, marriage certificate among others as collateral substitute (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013).
While in Russia, household items may be perceived as collaterals if they have sufficient personal
value for borrowers (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). Moreover, in Albania, lenders may accept
tangible assets like stocks as collaterals substitutes (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013).

Among the other mechanisms that can sustain high repayment rates is the regular repayment
schedule. Microfinance practioners believe that the discipline imposed by regular repayment
maintains high repayment rates in the absence of collaterals (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). Moreover,
it has been proven to have several advantages such as, screening out borrowers that are
undisciplined at an early stage, and gives early warning for loan officers about future problems.
It also allows the bank to control cash flows before consumption or diversion, and finally
requires that the borrowers have a dependable additional income source as the repayment process
begins before investment brings its fruit (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013).
Microfinance institutions are likely to conduct non-financial products that are known as Business
Development Services (BDS) (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013). The provision of non-financial services
as a complementary to credit and saving services works on improving the economic viability of
the borrower to satisfy the debt. More importantly, it creates a valuable relationship between the
former and the institutions. It has been found that the provision of non-financial services was
positively correlated with repayment performance and may be the facet that guarantees the
success of microcredit program (Ibtissem & Bouri, 2013).
Nemoto, Yoshino, Okubo, Inaba and Yanagisawa (2018) view that the default prediction is likely
to improve when a model based on bank account information is used . If the utilization of the
bank account information has been mainstreamed, banks will be able to reduce credit costs,
review times and costs, and make loans to SMEs with greater efficiency. The reason for the
potential success of such model, is that the bank account information cannot be manipulated nor
altered by an information provider for the purposes of tax returns or loan applications. Hence the
bank receiving the account information can examine the data even if the target company is a new
customer. Hence, eliminating concerns regarding the credibility of the information and the
personnel costs to scrutinize it, which deeply impact financial scoring loans. Employment of the
bank account information model, allows banks to calculate the upper lending limit. By having a
hand on the annual cash flow of the borrowers' account, a bank can estimate the realistic amount
a borrower can repay. Based on this estimation, a bank can have better determination on the
loan's amount. (Nemoto et al., 2018).
Bazarbash (2019) perceives that Emergent Market Economies (EMEs) are challenged by low
financial inclusion and could really gain from financial technology (Fintech) lending. This end

could be realized by applying machine learning (ML) based credit rating that can bring about
substantial consequences in the credit market in these economies. By improving credit analysis,
Fintech lending can reduce the time of credit decision and generate lower loan rates to existing
borrowers. Among the main financial constraints in EMEs that confines the growth pace of the
financial sector, are the lengthy credit decisions and high loan rates. Banks and Fintech lenders
benefit by appropriately pricing the risk. Hence, lowering the debt servicing cost for borrowers
while enhancing their asset quality (Bazarbash, 2019).
Fintech can further assist in mainstreaming financial inclusion by lending to the underserved
population relying on enhancing credit rating given that credit bureaus are either non-existent or
poorly developed in EMEs. The asset quality of these borrowers will be lower than conventional
borrowers. The fact that compel lenders to take more risk and should therefore offset the risk by
holding sufficient buffer reserves and capital. Machine learning evaluation of credit risk should
allow for measuring the amount of buffer (Bazarbash, 2019).
II.d.2 Institutional Answers to Control Credit Risk
Turner and Varghese (2010) paper on consumer credit information sharing, presents valuable
means to control credit risk which is very applicable on financial inclusion case of extending
loans for underserved segments of the community. The authors outline that the problem of
asymmetric information in lending arises from the fact that a creditor knowledge of the
borrower's potential to repay, that is, the risk profile, is vague and must be inferred based on
available information. Hence one common result of information asymmetry is the misallocation
of credit, as risk profiles are incorrectly assessed, where high risk borrowers confused for low
risk ones and vice versa (Turner & Varghese, 2010).
Turner and Varghese has cited the work of Stiglitz and Weiss on the implications of information
asymmetry that pointed out that in competitive equilibrium, credit market can witness rationing
owing to insufficient information. Information asymmetry leads banks to rely on a combination
of pricing (interest rates) and rationing to increase returns. However, high interest rates while
covering the risk of borrower default result in adverse selection. That is higher interest rates
attract borrowers seeking to make risky investments with potential for high rates of return
(Turner & Varghese, 2010).

Stiglitz and Weiss view that the price mechanism on its own may not clear the loan markets due
to the fact that, with interest rate increase to cover for high risk profiles, riskier applicants tend to
be attracted. Furthermore, some borrowers are enticed to make riskier investments to cover for
the price of credit. In addition, borrowers will be lured not to pay as in the absence of
information sharing, they can still acquire loans from other lenders. Facing this moral hazard,
which is the relative lack of penalty for non-payment, moreover the problem of adverse selection
that stem from information asymmetry, lenders will have to ration credits. Credit rationing
occurs when two individuals with identical risk preferences and profiles, one will receive a loan
while the other would not (Turner & Varghese, 2010).
According to Turner and Varghese, credit bureaus are the institutional answer to the problems of
information asymmetry and moral hazard in credit markets. Information sharing open a pathway
to a lender to better assess the risk profile of a potential borrower and introduce incentives to
have a borrower pay on time in the form of narrowing the former's future ability to access credit
from other suppliers. In presenting information about potential borrower to a lender, Credit
Reporting Agencies (CRA) play a crucial role in reducing informational asymmetry and moral
hazard by allowing interest rates that are fine-tuned, or that reflect the risk of the individual
borrower. This leads to adjust to lower interest rates for lower risk borrowers. CRA's also allow
for a lower average interest rate, greater lending through reduced rationing, and lower rates of
delinquency and default (Turner & Varghese, 2010).
Credit reporting regime has an impact on lending availability. The research suggests that full-file
comprehensive credit reporting widens credit opportunities to the private sector than other credit
reporting regimes such as negative-only reporting. Full-file comprehensive reporting results in
better loan performance than segmented and negative-only reporting regime. Comprehensive
credit reporting works on including non-financial data, the fact that increases access and improve
performance compared to a system in which information sharing is restricted to the financial
sector (Turner & Varghese, 2010).
According to the Global Partnership on Financial Inclusion (GPFI), the improvement of the
infrastructure for SME finance should be tackled through enhancing the credit report system and
enabling a better access to financial information by Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
(MSME). The GPFI has reported that in 1997 the Peruvian Superintendency of Banking has

conducted a series of overhauling that render the credit bureaus more effective in reducing the
risk and costs of lending, especially to MSMEs. The two most important changes were the
introduction of all loans, not just large loans, in the required information and the extension of
coverage to a range of nonbank entities (municipal banks, rural banks, and micro and SME
development lenders. The other improvement entailed the disclosure of this information to
private credit bureaus and the inclusion of a wider range of debt. Moreover, overhauling of the
credit report system has taken into consideration the inclusion of positive as well as negative
information (GPFI, 2014). For MSMEs, this means lower costs and better risk management. As
per the GPFI, these changes have instigated higher competition and has decreased interest rates
(GPFI, 2014).
The Euro Mediterranean Network of Economic Studies (EMNES) (2018) on financial
development and inclusion in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia has cited Credit Guarantee
Company‟s (CGC) as a tool to enhance access to finance, which is the main pillar to economic
development achieved by supporting MSMEs seeking funding. CGCs provide guarantees to
MSMEs without collaterals, or with inadequate collateral and track records to seek financing
opportunity without the necessity of a guarantee. Moreover, CGC works on covering percentage
of the risk pertaining to enterprises besides its provision of guarantee to the MSMEs (EuroMediterranean Network of Economic Studies, 2018).
CGC is likely to play a crucial role to remedy the status distinguishing the economies in
transition from other economies, is that the financing gap can be extremely pronounced for
factors such as, the lack of usable collaterals. This is in addition to the narrow range of assets that
can be collateralized compared to more developed economies. In emerging economies, banks act
as the only viable source of external financing. This is because in emergent economies, most of
capital providers are capital importers, with a significant part of foreign capital inflows is
arriving from the foreign direct investment or intercompany loans. These types of funds are
likely not to be available for SMEs. In addition to this, the information gap between SMEs and
the non-resident capital providers is huge, this as the capital owner lacks knowledge of the local
situation that is indispensable for funding small companies (Euro-Mediterranean Network of
Economic Studies, 2018).

CGCs are likely to be important in times of economic and cyclical setbacks. In times of
increasing volatility, the financing gap for SMEs are likely to widen. The reasons for credit
decline in times of financial stress, is the degraded capital of banks and liquidity positions that
decreases the supply of credit in general across the economy. The high uncertainty that positively
impact moral hazard and adverse selection that come as a natural element in SMEs lending. The
matter that encourages banks to limit credit provision to SMEs. Other reasons may include the
declining value of collateralized lending as the values of several collateral decrease in time of
financial distress. Moreover, other sources of external financing such as trade credit dwindles
just the same. In this respect, the demand for credit is likely to decline as well in time of
economic downturns. In practice, it is observed that authorities in various countries responded to
post-crisis slowdowns by offering large-scale guarantee programs for SMEs (EuroMediterranean Network of Economic Studies, 2018).
However, the European Investment Fund has identified key constraints for the use of credit
guarantee. The most important constraint is the lack of credit demand by SME's. This in turn will
impact on the demand for CGC, as the former's credit activity is conditional on the demand for
loan. This is likely to occur for purely economic aspects such as SME's business plans or
profitability measures, or other hurdles such as the lack of collateral or high borrowing costs.
Another issue hampering CGC's from realizing their goals, is the eligibility problem. Guarantee
products are accessible only to a narrow range of clients and the product parameters exclude
potential clients that do not fit into the specific criteria. The administrative procedures related to
credit guarantee is a key factor that hinders the use of credit guarantee. The cost assigned to
guarantee products are among the most crucial impediments that discourage SME's to use this
benefit for their own sake. This is likely to heavily persist especially when the banks have done
their part of the deal to facilitate access to credit by lowering interest rates (EBCI-Vienna
Initiative, 2014).
II.d.3 Monetary Policy Answers to Control Credit Risk
Shedding light on the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation, some
contributions perceive that bank capital may hamper liquidity creation by making the bank's
capital structure less fragile. A bank occupying this status is likely to be committed to monitor its
borrowers, allowing it to extend loans. Additional equity capital hinders the less fragile bank to
commit to monitoring, which in turns impede the bank's ability to create liquidity (Berger &

Bouwman, 2009). Furthermore, capital may reduce liquidity creation because it crowds out
deposits. According to Berger and Bouwman (2009) this is known as financial fragilitycrowding out hypothesis (Berger & Bouwman, 2009).
In this respect, a counter argument pertaining to banks as risk transformers is being provided.
Higher capital improves banks' ability to absorb risk, herein their ability to create liquidity. The
creation of liquidity makes banks more prone to risks. The greater the liquidity being created, the
higher the likelihood and severity of losses associated with having to get rid of illiquid assets to
satisfy customers' demand for liquidity. Capital absorb risks and expands the banks' risk-bearing
capacity, thus, higher capital ratios allow banks to create more liquidity. These set of theories are
referred to as risk absorption hypothesis. In this light, these predictions are only the product of
these theories combined rather that separated (Berger & Bouwman, 2009)
According to the World Bank report on enabling an environment for financial inclusion in the
MENA region, deficiencies are found in the financial infrastructures and regulations that enforce
it. This makes the increasing access to finance much costly and risky for banks. Lenders have to
depend on collaterals that require hefty costs to register and credit assessments and risk
management techniques that became obsolete. As per the report, the slight improvement of credit
information quality and availability, moreover, the increasing efficiency of credit registries and
the establishment of credit bureaus is not being accessed by microfinance institutions nor
reported to them (Pearce, 2011).
The report which was published back in 2011, has reported that interest rate flexibility is being
constrained. More than 6 MENA countries have placed caps on interest rates. Furthermore, most
countries in the MENA region use disclosure requirements rather than usury ceilings in practice
with the end in mind to guaranty the transparency of interest rates. However, it would have been
much of a transparent approach to remove interest rate caps and instead strengthen consumer
protection against exploitative practices such as excessive fees on overdraft and lack of
consumer redress and miss-selling of financial products (Pearce, 2011).
For financial inclusion to thrive, financial infrastructure requires an overhauling. Moral hazard
and adverse selection decrease when the collateral framework and the credit information system
are ameliorated. Loans can be offered at a lowered cost and risk to clients that would have been
previously excluded. Financial inclusion booming is conditioned by the enforcement of

transaction laws, unified collateral registries to ease the process for lenders to use the former as
guarantees. Only by then, micro entrepreneur will be hindered to leverage current assets into
access to finance (Pearce, 2011).
Ghenemi, Chaibi, and Omri (2017) in their study about the effect of liquidity and credit risk on
bank stability covering the MENA region, have cited the work of Dermine (1986) that liquidity
risk is seen as a profit lowering cost. A loan default would work on increasing liquidity risk due
to the lowered cash inflows and the depreciation it causes. According to the theory of financial
intermediation and the industrial organization approach to banking, there is a relationship
between liquidity and credit risk. Moreover, risky banks assets generate bank shocks. Hence, we
can reach the conclusion that liquidity and credit risk are positively related and together they
contribute to banking instability (Ghenemi et al. 2017).
According to the authors, in the case of increasing number of economic projects that are funded
with loans, the bank will face difficulties to meet the demand of depositors. Herein, these
depositors will claim back their money if the value of assets have deteriorated. This means that
credit and liquidity risk increase back to back (Ghenemi et al. 2017).
Banks' default risk is primarily driven by low capitalization and earnings, over exposure to
certain categories of loans and extreme loan defaults. Moreover, banks should be regulated on
the assets side instead of that of the capital. Banks should hold more liquid assets that would
allow them to face liquidity risk and manage and monitor risks to which they are exposed
(Ghenemi et al. 2017).
Awad and Eid (2018) clarifies in their study in an effort to analyze the weight of economic
benefit of financial access against the effect on risk profile of bank and non-bank lending. The
redistribution of credit towards new borrowers' segments comes with a cost at the account of
financial intermediation efficiency illustrated in higher screening and information costs. In
addition to changes in the risk profiles of bank lending as they issue loans to novel borrowers
that are perceived as riskier clients. In other words, if the expansion of credit is not well
managed, and if combined with low capitalization, can lead to financial crises (Awad & Eid,
2018).

According to the authors, financial inclusion can improve firms' access to credit and assist
financial institutions in diversifying their loan portfolios. In this respect, extending loans to firms
that were previously excluded may decrease the average credit risk of loan portfolios. However,
increasing financial inclusion is not a safety valve for financial stability. If financial inclusion is
coupled with a huge appetite for credit growth, financial risk may rise. Financial inclusion can be
disseminated by involving the poor who were previously underserved, by availing credit for him
or her. Nevertheless, paying no attention to their ability to repay the loan can compromise on the
humane purpose of financial inclusion. As a result, this can degrade the lending standards.
Moreover, financially excluded households by nature, lack historical records which are prevalent
where personal identification systems are weak. Besides, there are bounds to speed limits to
banks' ability to absorb a new customer without seeing deterioration in credit quality, owing to
limits in screening capacity. The authors also added that an increase in financial inclusion, leads
to fast paced structural change that compels central banks to retain sufficient capacity to monitor
and react to any system-wide risks that could develop (Awad & Eid, 2018).
Awad and Eid (2018) has cited the work of Čihák, Mare, & Melecky on studying the nexus
between financial inclusion and stability as two policy objectives and estimating the association
between both. The results have concluded that on average, financial inclusion and financial
stability are negatively correlated and hence linked more through trade-offs than synergies.
According to the cited authors, the inclusion-stability nexus is most influenced by financial
openness, fiscal freedom, education, and the depth of the credit information system. While
financial openness stimulates trade-offs between inclusion and stability, fiscal freedom,
education and credit information depth generate synergies between the targeted variables. Hence,
if financial policy aims to push for individual financial inclusion, complementary policies to
deepen credit information system could help mitigate the estimated trade-offs with financial
stability (Awad & Eid, 2018).
Another vital point, is that people using financial services should be capable financially. This is
perceived to be a major challenge in country having low GDP levels and higher level of poverty.
Herein, governments shall not advance the virtues of financial inclusion services to high poverty
segments of the community without basic level of education that aid in instigating the

beneficiaries' awareness about different financial institutions furnishing different financial
services (Awad & Eid, 2018).
According to Castellanos, Henrnandez, Mahajan, and Sierra (2019), based on an experiment
conducted to answer whether banks can use contract terms to moderate borrower risks. In other
words, whether altering contract terms can stimulate change in borrowers' behavior. While the
experiment has been developed in the realm of the Mexico‟s banking industry, the study has
found that providing credit cards to “new to banks” borrowers, results in substantial risk, with
44% of the experiment‟s control group has exited the bank over the 27 months of the experiment.
A proxy for net banks revenues has been constructed and found that the average net present
value of the 27 month experience net revenue per account is 623 pesos while the standard
deviation is 2580 pesos. Using a wide range of observables, we can explain that less than 5% of
the variation in card default, exit, and profits. Together these two facts signify that lending to
new to bank borrowers is risky and that it is hard to predict at the time the card is issued
(Castellanos et al. 2019).
To answer whether banks can use contract terms to mitigate the risk, the study has proven that
large changes in annual interest rates have limited effect on card debt and default for new to
banks borrowers. The correlation between default and the interest rate (or loan size) is
interpreted as a measure of moral hazard. As for minimum payment alteration, it has similar
effect to those of the interest rate changes (Castellanos et al. 2019).
The same study has resolved to the fact that, while 28% of new to banks borrowers do not
default on their first year, they get a second credit card issued by a different bank in the same
year compared to only 2% of clients defaulting on their first year. This process is known as
“poaching” of clients, may disincentive banks to lend customers with no credit history. In this
light, poaching can hinder financial inclusion, seeing that banks are aware that new to banks
borrowers who establish favorable credit history have tendency to be poached by other banks
(Castellanos et al. 2019).
According to Castellanos, Henrnandez, Mahajan, and Sierra (2019), based on experimental
results to reduce default levels by altering two key elements of the credit card contract, namely,
interest rates and minimum payments. The authors have concluded that by lowering the interest
rates from 45% to 15%, the default levels have decreased by 2.6 percentage points on a based

rate of 19% over a period of 26 months. The study also found a positive correlation between
default and interest rates which is interpreted as a measure of moral hazard (Castellanos et al.
2019).
While some policymakers are concerned that lowering minimum payment could result in
excessive borrowing hence increasing defaulting potential. This could have a drastic impact for
both borrowers and the financial institutions. In this respect, policy makers have advocated to
raise minimum payments. According to Castellanos and others (2019), increasing the minimum
payments can have two opposing effects that are not clear which one shall have dominance. On
one hand, it could reduce debt facilitating the repayment burden, thereby decreasing the default
level. On the other hand, it could tighten short run liquidity constraints, which increases the
default level (Castellanos et al. 2019).
In an effort to extricate the dual effect of raising the minimum payment, the study has resulted to
having the second effect (tightening liquidity constraints) was no longer operational as all
subjects were returned to common minimum payment of 4%, 3 years after the termination of the
experiment. However, debt is lower at the end of the experiment in the higher minimum payment
arms, thus, the repayment burden is respectively lowered. Moreover, during the experiment, both
effects of raising the minimum payment cancelled each other out, emphasizing the double-edged
nature of increasing minimum payment as policy tool to limit default (Castellanos et al. 2019).
In an attempt to investigate the relationship between financial inclusion and circumstances
monetary policy and economic fundamentals. Yin, Xu, Chen, and Peng's (2019) empirical results
show that monetary policy has a short term positive impact on financial inclusion factors
meanwhile economic fundamentals has the opposite. In other words, positive monetary policy
promotes the development of financial inclusion in the short term and sudden change of the
economic situation will make it harder (Yin et al., 2019).
Shihadeh, Gamage and Hannoon (2019) have resolved that enhancing credit to SMEs would
decrease the value of the non-performing loans in banks operating in Palestine. The study has
also covered SMEs applying to the European Palestinian Credit Guarantee Fund (EPCGF) that
encourages banks to extend more credit to SME's at a minimum level of risk. In addition, to
allowing more source of financing to SMEs, banks can become more involved in other activities
related to SME's by providing training and financial management, and investing in technologies.

In this light, convincing banks to invest in SME through providing credit could have a positive
outcome on the former's performance (Shihadeh et al., 2019).
Lopez and Winkler (2019) have approached financial inclusion and credit risk away from the
usual angle of having more inclusive banking sectors experiencing less crisis. However, given a
crisis, a higher level of financial inclusion or a stronger development in financial inclusion in the
times preceding the crisis, produces a benefit in the form of a less pronounced drop in credit
growth, controlling for the size of the pre-crisis credit boom. Moreover, the authors test whether
financial inclusion is a subject of boom-bust pattern. Meaning, whether a stronger borrower
growth in pre-crisis period is linked to a steeper fall in borrower growth in a crisis. The results
have supported that more inclusive banking sectors are likely to record decreases in credit and
borrower growth in times of crisis. The study has also found that higher borrower growth rates in
times preceding the crisis are not related to the depth of the credit bust following a crisis. This is
to conclude, that countries are likely to gain from increasing levels of financial inclusion by
recording less pronounced bust in credit and borrower growth. This is to concur that higher
levels of financial inclusion make financial systems more resilient in times of crises.
Nonetheless, the rapid development of financial inclusion has no mitigating effect on credit
developments in a crisis, given pre-crisis credit development (Lopez & Adalbert, 2019).

II.e Improving Economic Stability by Increasing Access to Financial
Institutions
Financial inclusion shall not exclude customers lacking track records to be allowed to acquire
loans and employ this debt for a better quality of life. However, financial inclusion has been
gaining much more significance and popularity by international organizations and leading
developmental financial institutions for allowing people into the formal economy by depositing
and saving money in banks. This humane product should be sponsored by governments by
furnishing policies capable of lessening the conventional hurdles that hamper the citizens' ability
to open bank accounts. Moreover, the governments should work on enhancing citizens' trust into
the official economy represented by the banks and other financial institutions. This increased
access into banks that is going to act in its turn to secure regular cash flow will have a positive
impact on the economy as a whole. Besides, it will serve the usual setback committed by
financial inclusion illustrated in the increasing lending risk. In other words, the increasing cash
flows as a product of savings and deposits account could assist the banks in providing for the

risks caused by financial risks. This is to say, that increasing bank access leads to higher liquidity
which could enhance the banks reserves to cover lending risks or NPLs.
Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan (2005) have cited the explanation of banks' structure by arguing
that pooling funds in intermediary agents can guarantee against liquidity shocks while still
investing most of their funds in high return but illiquid projects. This structure advances the
potential of self-sustaining banks and a policy for deposit insurance. The authors have also
reached the conclusion that banks' risks measured by stock volatility increase unused loan
commitments and reflect liquidity risk exposure. This increase is alleviated by transaction
deposits. Moreover, the risk does not increase with loan commitments for banks with transaction
deposits. (Gatev et al., 2005).
The authors have also extended these results by testing how the deposit-lending diversification
synergy varies across market conditions. Banks having high level transaction deposits have
decreased risks with the level of unused commitments when the spread of commercial papertreasury bills are high. The deposit-lending hedge is prevailing in times when the short term
credit market become expensive because banks face increased take-down demands by borrowers
shocked by tight market conditions at the same time that they are experience funding inflows
into their transaction deposits. The inflows and outflows offset in turn strengthen the risk
management synergy. Furthermore, transaction deposit plays an important role in allowing banks
to manage their liquidity risk (Gatev et al., 2005).
Basu (2005) on a study pertaining to the development of a financial system to India's poor,
building an inclusive banking system will require more radical overhauling in order to ameliorate
incentive regime, promote competition and enhance the efficiency of rural financial institutions
and markets. One of the suggested measures is allowing the most competitive lender to enter in
rural areas and decrease distortion by having the government make a priority sector lending
obligations tradable. The highest competing lender will be paid by the less well placed banks to
effectively take their priority lending requirements for a price. Creating a market for priority
lending requirements would benefit the rural poor and the banks. They will be able to access
finance via the most competitive institutions (Basu, 2005).
Another suggested measure is for the government to revisit its policy on interest rates caps
pertaining to rural lending rates and floors on deposit rates. Poor borrowers are deprived of

accessing finance and end up paying high interest rates to informal lenders. In addition to that,
the entry of new private banks in rural finance could be a good indication for other rural banks to
reduce transaction costs and making rural banking profitable. This move shall be sponsored by
the governments that should create an environment that would make it possible and lucrative for
interested private banks to emerge in the rural financial market. Moreover, much is needed to
increase competition in rural banking by liberating interest rates, hence, lending to small and
rural clients can become more profitable business for banks. Having mentioned the emergence of
banks in rural areas, governments will have to amend their policies on branch licensing, as
private banks may be interested in buying up the branch networks of the government-owned
rural banks (Basu, 2005).
The author perceives that weaknesses in regulatory standards, slacking enforcement, and
regulatory forbearance have invested deeply in the financial distress that characterizes many
regional rural banks and cooperatives and have undermined market discipline. Prudential
regulation standards such as capital adequacy, income recognition, asset classification, and
provisioning for regional rural banks and cooperatives need to cope with standards governing
commercial banks, and supervisory enforcement needs to be strengthened (Basu, 2005).
Beck, Kunt, Peria (2007) view that broad financial services outreach is vital for several reasons.
That are a well-developed financial system for economic development and poverty alleviation.
Financial market imperfections such as transaction costs, information asymmetries, contract
enforcement costs are likely to have their toll on poor households and or small entrepreneurs
who lack collateral, credit history, and connections. The lack of access to financial services in
general places impedes poor households and small entrepreneurs to realize high return
investments, it also reduces the efficiency of resources allocations and impact growth negatively
and poverty alleviation (Beck et al., 2007).
Honohan (2008) has reported that products' features such as high minimum cover for an
insurance product, or hefty penalties for unauthorized overdraft which tends to be inevitable to
avoid for poor people using checking accounts. In addition to have a fixed address as a prerequisite to open an account, are all illustrations of obstacles standing in the way between the
end-user and these products. In some other cases, customers may be screened out because of risk
characteristics. Other obstacles hampering the utility of these services is the rationalization of

branches and service points may lead to in many poor customers compelled to travel far
distances to make an account worthwhile. For the reason that full participation in economic life
in advanced economies rely on having an account in a financial intermediary, and given the extra
costs often on non-account holders, several countries have adopted policies in recent years to
reduce financial exclusion (Honohan, 2008).
Honohan perceives exclusion in low and middle income countries to be normal for the bulk of
the population. Thus it is normal to entertain broadening the access to financial services rather
than the elimination of exclusion as the immediate goal. With that being said, it is rational that
microfinance emerges heavily in this breading environment for financial development.
Microfinance pioneers have shed light on the very high rates of returns that can be earned by the
poor and the near-poor in urban and peri-urban settings. This furnishes a high demand for
borrowings even at high interest rates. Some microfinance institutions work on credit–only basis,
funding themselves from charitable donors, while some others employ forced savings elements
to the loan framework. In general, the trend is to emphasize deposits the same way as loans as a
vital tool for efficient financial management, no matter they represent precautionary savings, or
means of accumulating capital. It is also crucial to mention that transaction accounts are also
important for receiving and making remittances on a local and international levels among family
members (Honohan, 2008).
Mookerjee and Kalipioni (2010) have concluded in their studies that there is a robust support for
the general idea that micro focused measures of financial development have a positive impact on
the poor and income distribution. The study has resolved to the fact that better access to bank
branches, which is translated into availing banking services to the underserved segments of the
community have positive impact on the poor. However, the study has detected that higher
barriers to banking services measured by imposing higher minimums to open checking/savings
account has negative impact on income distribution (Mookerjee & Kalipioni, 2010).
Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) has concluded that the physical and human capital investments by
the poor are subject to liquidity constraints. Moreover, improvement in the financial
intermediation positively affects the poor because it creates opportunities for the former to
possess liquid assets and earn higher return on their savings. In times of economic booming, they
may start from benefiting from greater availability of credit. However, bank crises are likely to

harm the poor who have very few opportunities to diversity their assets (Jeanneney & Kdobar,
2011).
Celerier and Matray (2016) on a study about bank branch supply and the unbanked phenomenon,
perceives that being unbanked is driven by supply and or demand side factors. The demand side
revolves around cultural determinants, that is, distrust in financial institutions or may not have
culture of saving. Financial literary also remains a major persistent element of a deeply rooted
communal culture. On the other hand, the supply side suggests that standard bank practices
create obstacles for the poor. Minimum account balance, overdraft fees, a large distance between
branches, results in increasing costs that may be to burdening for poor households to manage.
Moreover, banking services may not be customized to match the demands of low-income
households. These hurdles can have different policy implications. The demand side predicts
intervention at the household level through financial literacy programs, while the supply side
concerning banking regulations should be solved by giving banking incentives to amend their
behavior, which lead to reducing the share of unbanked households (Celerier & Matray, 2016).
Kodongo (2018) has analyzed the relationship between capital adequacy and liquidity and credit
to high risky small scale agriculture. The analysis has resided to the fact that, choking prudential
regulations could hamper the provision of credit to small businesses and therefore conflict with
the country's financial inclusion objectives. The capital adequacy requirement narrows banks'
ability to avail credit to small business clients and may result in credit rationing. However, the
author sees that the effect of capital regulations on credit provision could be controlled with few
macroeconomic enablers. These enablers could be in the form of measures implemented to
achieve stability in the financial sector and in the macroeconomic environment (Kodongo, 2018).
This emerges with the end in mind to reduces the level of financial exclusion which in its turn
threatens financial integrity. In other words, seeing financially excluded individuals resort to
informal financial services, this is likely to compromise on the effectiveness of anti-money
laundering and counter-financing terrorism measures which are two of the main priorities on the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)'s agenda. In this respect, there are concerns that the
establishment of some financial integrity jurisdictions such as, raising costs of compliance,
imposing regulatory obstacles against new service providers and creating eligibility barriers
could cease the realization of financial inclusion. Henceforth, to reduce the tension lying in the

nexus of financial integrity and financial inclusion, the FATF recommends that low-income
countries to have exemptions such as relaxing identification requirements in specific well
instances, which is the case in countries like India (Kodongo, 2018).
Anarfo, Abor, and Osei (2019) views that despite the role performed by financial regulation to
block distortion to competition, sustaining integrity of the market, and reducing information
asymmetry, they may also have unwanted implications by hampering the efficient intermediation
process of financial institutions and inhibit their ability to provide financial services. For
example, capital adequacy regulation may force some banks that are not financially competent to
cease business or merge with other banks and this may cause barriers to emerge into the banking
sector. Naturally, this will decrease competition and the availability of funds to commercial
banks for lending, which will eventually harm the realization of financial inclusion.
Nevertheless, low credit volumes dictated by iron fist financial regulations, may encourage
lenders to seek profits by lending to only successful credit applications at high interest rates.
Furthermore, this will curb levels of access to credit, hence, leading to low financial inclusion
(Anarfo et al., 2019).
We can observe that Anarfo et. al have a sort of agreement with the views of Kondogo.
However, the former have introduced financial stability measured by the bank Z-score to
moderate the relationship between financial regulation and financial inclusion. In this respect, the
study has concluded that the interaction of financial stability and financial regulation has a
positive effect on financial inclusion in the study's population, that is, Sub-Saharan African
economies. This suggests that financial stability negates the negative consequences of financial
regulation on financial inclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa. This means that financial regulation has
no impact on financial inclusion when financial institutions is financially stable. Putting this fact
in mind, policy and regulatory bodies should focus on nurturing financial stability as a tool for
the propagation of financial service usage as well as for better financial decision making at the
micro and macro levels (Anarfo et .,2019).

Chapter Three
Statistical Tests, Estimations Methods and Results
Part One
III.1.a Introduction
In this Part the variables upon which the study is conducted are defined. Furthermore, the
sources from which the variables are extracted are highlighted. In addition, the part will be
devoted to achieve and discuss measures of rounded descriptive analysis such as Normality test;
Linearity test and the Heteroskedasticity test.
This section reports the results of regressing the common indicators of financial inclusion on an
indicators of banks‟ credit risk. The results are reported in tables (3-5), where table (1) list the
factors examined in the thesis and table (2) summarizes the factors used in the thesis. With the
end in mind to conduct the all the following estimations, the researcher has used Statistical
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).

III.1.b Data
The data about financial inclusion is obtained mainly from the Global Findex compiled by the
World Bank (https://globalfindex.worldbank.org/ ). This index includes data about financial
inclusion in three-year intervals 2011, 2014, 2017.
The data about banks‟ credit risk is obtained from Fitch IBCA‟s Bankscope database.
The data include banks located in the MENA region. The countries included in the study are
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, KSA, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta,
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia, UAE and Yemen.

III.1.c The Study variables
The variables examined in this thesis are as follows.
1. The Dependent variable (Y): The ratio of Provision for Loan Losses to Net Loans. This
ratio is taken as a proxy for credit risk.
2. The Independent variable (X): these include indicators of financial inclusion that have
been examined in the literature. These indicators are as follows.
X1: Saved at a financial institution (≥age15)
X2: Debit card ownership (≥age15)

X3: Borrowed from a financial institution (≥age15)
X4: Borrowed from a financial institution or used a credit card in labor force
(≥age15)
X5: Borrowed from a financial institution or used a credit card out of labor force
(≥age15)
In addition to the above-mentioned main variables, the Country effects and longevity effects are
examined through additional dummy variables in order to offer complete understanding to the
factors that may have effect on financial inclusion.
Table (1): List of the factors examined in the thesis

Variable
Saved at a financial institution
(≥age15)

Measure
The percentage of Respondents

References
Global Findex database

who report saving or setting aside
any money at a bank or another
type of financial institution in the
past 12 months.

Debit card ownership (≥age15)

The percentage of respondents

Global Findex database

who report having a debit card
Borrowed from a financial
institution (≥age15)

The percentage of respondents

Global Findex database

who report borrowing any money
from a bank or another type of
financial institution in the past 12
months

Borrowed from a financial
institution or used a credit card in
labor force (≥age15)

The percentage of respondents

Global Findex database

who report borrowing any money
from a bank or another type of
financial institution, or using a
credit card, in the past 12 months,
in labor force

Borrowed from a financial
institution or used a credit card out
of labor force (≥age15)

The percentage of respondents

Global Findex database

who report borrowing any money
from a bank or another type of
financial institution, or using a
credit card, in the past 12 months,
out of labor force

Ratio of Provision for Loan Losses

Credit risk

Fitch IBCA‟s Bankscope database

to Net Loans

The Study Model

Financial inclusion indicators

Dependent Variable
Saved at a financial institution
(≥age15)

Country
effect
Debit card ownership (≥age15)
Ratio of Provision
for Loan Losses to
Borrowed from a financial
institution (≥age15)

Net Loans taken
as a proxy for
credit risk.

Borrowed from a financial
institution or used a credit card
in labor force (≥age15)
Longevity

Borrowed from a financial
institution or used a credit card
Independent
Variables
out of labor force
(≥age15)

Dummy variables
Table (2) summarizes the factors examined in this thesis.
Source: The author

III.1.c The Study Methodology and Measures
In order to acquire rounded descriptive analysis and sound results, which in turn, lead to
achieving the main objective of the conducted study, thus, three technicalities and tests used
respectively presented as follow; Normality test; Linearity test and the Heteroskedasticity test.
First, the study uses the Normality test to determine if a data set is well-modeled by a normal
distribution. The tests also compute how likely it is for a random variable underlying the data set
to be normally distributed. Many statistical methods require that the data come from a normal
distribution or at least can be reasonably approximated by a normal distribution. Relatively,
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test is used where the latter test is said to be the

preferred test of normality because of its good power properties as compared to a wide range of
alternative tests (Shapiro, Wilk, & Chen, 1968).
Normality Test
Regarding the issue of normality, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test is used for testing
the closeness of the variables‟ distribution to the assumptions of the normal distribution.1 The
test is run under the hypothesis that:
H0: The data are drawn from normal distribution.
Ha: The data are drawn from non-normal distribution
The results of normality show that all variables are not normally distributed. Table (3) reports the
results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test.
Table (3): The Results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test for Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnova

ShapiroWilk

Statistic Df
Provision

Sig.

Statistic

df

Sig.

4.35734E-10

0.87806

524 7.2454E-20

0.14463 524

1.25883E-29

0.90828

524 3.0677E-17

0.21012 524

1.51609E-64

0.8876

524 4.2808E-19

0.15997 524

1.38563E-36

0.86716

524 1.0733E-20

for

loan losses to Net 0.08672 524
Loans
Saved

at

a

financial
institution
(≥age15)
Debit

card

ownership
(≥age15)
Borrowed from a
financial
institution
(≥age15)

Borrowed from a
financial
institution

or

used a credit card
in

labor

0.17537 524

2.53375E-44

0.86138

force

(≥age15)

524 4.0837E-21

Borrowed from a
financial
institution

or

used a creditcard
out of labor force
(≥age15)

0.24227 524

1.14524E-86

0.72428

524 1.6376E-28

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Therefore, an approximation to normality is necessary to satisfy the multivariate analysis main
assumptions. In other words, the variables are converted to normality in order to confirm that the
data sample is extracted from a normally distributed population. This assumption is
indispensable to conduct several statistical procedures such as the t-test, linear regression
analysis, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and discriminant analysis (Conover and Iman, 1979).2
Van der Waerden method is carried out to approximate data to normal distribution (Conover,
1980; van der Waerden, 1927, 1930, 1931; Wright, 2000) based on smoothed ranks. The signed
ranks are smoothed by converting them to quantiles of the normal distribution3 (normal scores)
using the equation that follows:

 R  xij  

Aij   1 
 T 1 



1

Conover, W.J. and Iman, R.L. (1979). On multiple-comparison procedures. Technical report, Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory
2

Krzysztofowicz, R. 1997. Transformation and normalization of variates with specified distributions, Journal of Hydrology,
197(1-4): 286–292.
Pohlert, T. 2014. The Pairwise Multiple Comparison of Mean Ranks Package (PMCMR). R package. Available at
http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=PMCMR

Aij = Normal score of each observation in a variable ( xij )

R  xij  = The ordinary rank where observations of a variable ( xij ) are ranked in an ascending
order.

 R  xij  

 = cumulative probabilities of each observation in a variable ( xij ). Ranks are smoothed
 T 1 


through the computation of the probability associated with each observation.
T = Total number of observations in a variable ( xij )
 1 = the quantile of the normal distribution is the inverse of each probability given by

 R  xij  


 T 1 



It is worth to note that, the dummy variables are not normalized as the values are binary, taking
values 1 and 0, therefore they are dichotomous.
Linearity Test
The issue of linearity versus nonlinearity is addressed and examined as well (Bahng and Jeong,
2012; Pao and Chih, 2005). Regression Equation Specification Error Test, RESET (Ramsey,
1969; Thursby and Schmidt, 1977; Thursby, 1979; Sapra, 2005; Wooldridge, 2006) is employed
to test the two hypotheses that follow:
For the test the null hypothesis is
H0: y tk  α k 

k

β
i 1

ik

Xitk  k  tk

And the alternative hypothesis is:
H1: y tk  f ( Xitk , α k ,βik , k )  tk
where f is any nonlinear function
The null hypothesis refers to linearity and the alternative refers to nonlinearity.4 In case of
linearity, the OLS estimation condition is fulfilled. In case of non-linearity, the literature includes

4

F  statistic 

SSE R - SSE U   J
where SSE R and
SSE U  T - K 

SSE U

are the sum squared errors for the restricted and

unrestricted models respectively, J refers to the two hypotheses under consideration, T is the number of observations, and K is the
number of regressors.

different treatments. One treatment is to take the log or natural log to both dependent and
independent variables (Allen, 1997; Chatterjee and Hadi, 2012)56. The researcher of this thesis
argues that this treatment does not work out as many of the variables take negative values as well
as many variables are less than one. In case of negative values, the log or natural log do not exist.
In cases that the variables are less than one, either the log of natural log result in negative values
which cause distortions to the true relationship between the independent and dependent
variables.
Another treatment of the non-linear transformation is to address a polynomial transformation
when variables might be raised to a power either 2 to address quadratic relationship or 3 to
address cubic relationship (Berry and Feldman, 1985; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991; McClendon;
Briand and Carter. 2011)7. The researcher of this thesis has chosen to treat the independent
variables as cubic since it does not cause any change to the relationship between dependent and
independent variables. The negative values remain negative in cubic form. The same is true in
case of positive values.
The RESET test is an approximation to nonlinearity that has been recommended in well-known
econometric textbooks such as Greene. The objective of the test to approximate to nonlinearity.
The RESET test follows the F distribution. The results of the RESET test are reported in table
(4).
Table (4): The Results of the RESET test: main factors that affect financial inclusion
Hypothesis Testing Using the F
distribution
Data Input
J

2

T

524

K

5

SSE-restricted

0.03351

5

Allen, M. P. 1997. Understanding Regression Analysis. Plenum Press, New York.

6

Chatterjee, S. and Hadi, A.S. (2012) Regression Analysis by Example. 5th Edition, Wiley, New York, 98.

7

Briand, G. and Hill, R. Carter. 2011. Using Excel for Principles of Econometrics. 4th edition, Wiley

SSE-Unrestricted

0.03279

Alpha (Prob)

5.00%

Computed Values
df-numerator

2

df-denominator

519

F

5.7136

Right Critical Values

3.0131

Decision

Reject Ho

p-value

0.00351

Thus, the independent variable is raised to the power of 3 as way of approximation to nonlinear
form.
Heteroskedasticity Test
Heteroskedasticity refers to varying variances of the error term which causes bias in the statistical
estimation. The researcher uses Breusch-Pagan test (1979) and Cook-Weisberg (1982,1983) test
to examine the extent to which the amounts of FDI are heterogeneous.8 The standard test runs on
the square of the error term. The test is run under the hypotheses and the estimation equation that
follow:
n

eˆit2     i xit  i
t 1

̂

H0: “Error variances are all equal (Homoskedastic)”
H1: “Error variances are not equal (Heteroskedastic)”
Table (5): The Results of Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity.
Lagrange Multiplier Test Template
Data Input
524
Number of parameters (s)
5
8

Breusch, T. S., and A. R. Pagan. 1979. A simple test for heteroscedasticity and random coefficient variation.
Econometrica 47: 1287–1294.
Cook, R. D., and S. Weisberg. 1982. Residuals and Influence in Regression. New York: Chapman & Hall/CRC.
________________________. 1983. Diagnostics for heteroscedasticity in regression. Biometrika 70: 1–10.

R square
Alpha
Computed Values
Degree of Freedom (m=s-1)
Critical Value - Chi square
Lagrange Multiplier Test

0.00665
5%
4
9.49
3.4842

Chi Square stat
Conclusion
p-value
Conclusion

Do Not Reject
H0
0.48028
Do Not Reject
H0

The results reported in table (5) show that Heteroskedasticity doesn‟t exist.
Estimation Model
The general estimating equation of a nonlinear model takes the form of Least Squares Dummy
Variables (LSDV) that follows.
k

3
y tk  α k   β ik Xitk
 k   tk
i 1

Where t = 1, …..,n
k = number of countries in each group.
y tk = The ratio of Provision for Loan Losses to Net Loans.
X itk = Indicators of Financial Inclusion in addition to dummy variables to control for the country

effects and longevity effects.

k = Random error term due to the individual effect.
 tk = Random error.

Hausman Test
The researcher has carried out the well-known Hausman test for determining whether the models
are subject to Fixed or Random effect.9 The results are as follows. Hausman (1978) test is used
to choose between a fixed or random-effects model. null Hypothesis is that random Effects
Model is appropriate test. Table (6): Hausman Test Results (Fixed Effect Model vs. Random
Effect Model).

Chi-square
statistic

Chisquare
degrees
of
freedom

10.288263

5

Prob.

0.0675

The results reported in Table (6) show that the null hypothesis is not rejected at 5% significant
level implying that the model follows random effects.

9

Hausman, J.A. (1978), “Specification tests in econometrics”, Econometrica, Vol. 46 No. 6, pp. 1251-1271.

Part 2
III.2.a Introduction
In this section we shall run the regression equation on several iterations, we regress the proxy for
credit risk against the financial inclusion indicators, then in the following iterations we add the
countries effect and the Longevity effect one at a time. Post observing the outcomes of the
empirical analysis we shall compare them with the previous literature review to identify whether
they challenge past scholars' arguments or they support them. However, the longevity effect is
the latest contribution to the literature and hence it will suffice to only comment on the results in
this regard.
This section reports the results of regressing the common indicators of financial inclusion on the
indicator of banks‟ credit risk. The results are reported in tables (1-14).
3.2-1 Part One: The Results for the Effect of Indicators of Financial Inclusion on Banks’
Credit Risk
Table (1): Model Summary of the effect of the Main Indicators of Financial Inclusion on
Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524)
b

Model Summary

Adjusted
R Square
.055

Std. Error
of the
Estimate
.00824498

DurbinR
R Square
Watson
a
.253
.064
1.180
a. Predictors: (Constant),
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardoutoflaborforc,
Debitcardownershipage15, Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionage15,
Savedatafinancialinstitutionage15,
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardinlaborforceag
b. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans
Model
1

Table (2): ANOVA table for the Effect of Indicators of Financial Inclusion on Banks’
Credit Risk (N = 524)
a

ANOVA
Model
1 Regression

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Square

df

.002

5

0.00048

Residual

.035

518

0.00007

Total

.038

523

a. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans

F
7.097

Sig.
.000

b

b. Predictors: (Constant),
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardoutoflaborforc,
Debitcardownershipage15, Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionage15,
Savedatafinancialinstitutionage15,
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardinlaborforceag

Table (3): The effect of the Indicators of Financial Inclusion on Banks’ Credit Risk (N =
524)
Coefficients

Model
1 (Constant)
Savedatafinancialinstitutionage
15

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error

a

Standar
dized
Coeffici
ents
Beta

t
17.16
8

Sig.

Collinearity Statistics
Toler
ance
VIF

.008

.000

.000

-.031

.022

-.138

1.372

.171

.178

5.629

.009

.003

.211

3.633

.000

.535

1.870

.022

.065

.033

.343

.732

.191

5.239

-.041

.015

-.961

2.667

.008

.014

7.904

.174

.073

.855

2.372

.018

.014

7.967

Debitcardownershipage15

Borrowedfromafinancialinstituti
onage15

Borrowedfromafinancialinstituti
onorusedacreditcardinlaborforc
eag

Borrowedfromafinancialinstituti
onorusedacreditcardoutoflaborf
orc

a. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans

3.2-2 Part Two: The Results for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion and
Country Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk
Table (4): Model Summary of the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion and Country
Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524)
b

Model Summary

Std. Error
Adjusted
of the
DurbinModel
R
R Square R Square
Estimate
Watson
a
1
.662
.438
.413 .00650032
1.592
a. Predictors: (Constant), Yemen, Libya, Djibouti, Oman, Qatar, Syria,
Morocco, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, KSA, Malta, Tunisia, Jordan,
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardoutoflaborforc, Algeria,
UAE, Egypt, Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionage15,
Debitcardownershipage15, Savedatafinancialinstitutionage15,
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardinlaborforceag, Israel
b. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans

Table (5): ANOVA table for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion and Country
Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524)
a

ANOVA
Model
1 Regression

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Square

df

.016

23

0.00072

Residual

.021

500

0.00004

Total

.038

523

F
16.977

Sig.
.000

a. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans
b. Predictors: (Constant), Yemen, Libya, Djibouti, Oman, Qatar, Syria, Morocco, Iraq,
Kuwait, Bahrain, KSA, Malta, Tunisia, Jordan,
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardoutoflaborforc, Algeria, UAE,
Egypt, Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionage15, Debitcardownershipage15,
Savedatafinancialinstitutionage15,
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardinlaborforceag, Israel

b

Table (6): The effect for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion and Country Effects
on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524)
Coefficients

Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1 (Constant)
Saved at a
financial
institution
age15
Debit card
ownership
age15
Borrowed
from a
financial
institution
age15
Borrowed
from a
financial
institution or
used a credit
card in labor
force
Borrowed
from a
financial
institution or
used a credit
card out of
labor force
Algeria

B
0.0041

Std. Error
0.0013

-0.0383

0.0438

0.0044

a

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

Collinearity
Statistics
t
3.0661

Sig.
0.0023

Tolerance

VIF

-0.1734

-0.8740

0.3825

0.0285

5.0525

0.0048

0.0984

0.9144

0.03610

0.0971

8.3032

0.0854

0.1213

0.1282

0.7036

0.4820

0.0338

9.5776

-0.0261

0.0409

-0.6169

-0.6377

0.05240

0.0012

3.4219

-0.0533

0.2671

-0.2617

-0.1994

0.8420

0.0007

2.7141

0.0049

0.0016

0.1647

3.0431

0.0025

0.3836

2.6071

Bahrain

0.0048

0.0039

0.1167

1.2365

0.2169

0.1262

7.9268

Djibouti

0.0119

0.0040

0.1057

2.9934

0.0029

0.9011

1.1098

Egypt

0.0029

0.0016

0.1021

1.8298

0.0679

0.3608

2.7714

Iraq

0.0123

0.0020

0.2641

6.0222

0.0000

0.5840

1.7123

Israel

0.0264

0.0335

0.8724

0.7878

0.4312

0.0009

9.8204

Jordan

0.0074

0.0017

0.1985

4.3553

0.0000

0.5406

1.8498

KSA

0.0016

0.0021

0.0405

0.7999

0.4241

0.4371

2.2877

Kuwait

0.0092

0.0041

0.2085

2.2551

0.0246

0.1314

7.6100

Libya

0.0192

0.0040

0.1708

4.8321

0.0000

0.8987

1.1127

Malta

0.0086

0.0067

0.2154

1.2803

0.2010

0.0397

5.2128

Morocco

0.0048

0.0021

0.1006

2.3162

0.0210

0.5957

1.6788

Oman

-0.0015

0.0030

-0.0194

-0.5120

0.6088

0.7861

1.2721

Qatar

-0.0014

0.0027

-0.0206

-0.5358

0.5923

0.7621

1.3121

Syria

0.0142

0.0026

0.2171

5.5192

0.0000

0.7260

1.3774

Tunisia

0.0061

0.0017

0.1614

3.5403

0.0004

0.5403

1.8508

UAE

0.0096

0.0028

0.3576

3.4703

0.0006

0.1058

9.4535

0.4586

13.4146

0.0000

0.9609

1.0407

Yemen

0.0890
0.0066
a. Dependent Variable: Provision for loan losses / Net Loans

Given the output of table (1), this paper concludes that 6.4% variability in the dependent variable
can be explained by the independent variables, which is illustrated by the measure of quality of
fit provided by R squared. As noted by the significance of F test in the output from ANOVA
table (2), it implies that the regression model is significant in predicting the relationship between
financial inclusion indicators and credit risk.
In the attempt to regress the credit risk and financial inclusion indicators, the coefficients' table
(3) has yielded that "saving at financial institutions" and "borrowed from financial institutions"
predictor variables are not significant in predicting the relationship between the independent
variables and the dependent variable. It is also observed that "debit card ownership" and
"borrowed from financial institutions or used credit card out of labor force" has significant
positive relationship with credit risk. If these two variables increase, they will increase the credit
risk with 0.009 and 0.174 respectively. However, the predictor variable "borrowed from financial
institution or used credit card in labor force" has a significant negative relationship with credit
risk. Hence, when it increases, it will decrease the credit risk with 0.41. Having that said, it is
important to mention that the discussion to the results doesn‟t refer to the size of decrease or
increase in Xs. The discussion focuses mainly on the trend, being negative or positive, and the
significance.
It is worth to note that, Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) are used to detect collinearity (also
called multicollinearity) among predictors in a multiple linear regression model (Belsley, et al.
1980)10. High VIFs reflect an increase in the variances of estimated regression coefficients due to
collinearity among predictor variables, Basically, (VIF) is the quotient of the variance in a model
with multiple terms by the variance of a model with one term alone. It quantifies the severity of
multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression analysis. We analyze the magnitude of

10

Belsley D.A, Kuh E. and Welsch R.E. (1980) Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity,
New York: John Wiley & Son.

multicollinearity by considering the size of the VIF. A rule of thumb is that if VIF is greater than
10, then multicollinearity is high, (Kutner, 2004)11. Moreover, a cutoff of 5 is also commonly
used (Sheather, 2009)12.
By adding countries' individual effect on the model, there is an obvious improvement in the
model in table (4) given by adjusted R squared which increased from 5.5% to 41.3% This
observation indicates that the country effect is a good predictor to credit risk, which if otherwise,
the adjusted R square will decrease as a penalty for adding junk predictors to the regression
equation. It is also observed the STD Error has decrease from 0.00824 to 0.00650 indicating
model improvement. The output given by ANOVA table (5), the significance of the F test states
that the regression model is significant in predicting the relationship between financial inclusion
indicators and countries' effect impact on the credit risk.
The coefficient table (6) has provided that only the predictor variable "debit card ownership" and
"borrowed from a financial institution or used a credit card in labor force (≥age15)" are
significant predictors to the credit risk. Moreover, "debit card ownership" variable have positive
relationship with the credit risk, however. "borrowed from a financial institution or used a credit
card in labor force" has a negative relationship with credit risk. As for the countries effect, the
thesis concludes that the countries the most affected by credit risk caused by financial inclusion
initiatives are Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and
Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen.
The provisions of the empirical analysis prove the argument of Khan (2011), Merhotra and
Yetman (2015), and Sahay et al (2015). That is financial inclusion can contribute negatively to
financial stability due to the expansion of the pool of borrowers that blemishes the lending
standards given by the positive relationship between credit risk variable and "borrowing from a
financial institution or through a credit card out of labor force". Also they prove the argument of
Hanning and Jansen (2010) that states that the inclusion of low income groups in the financial
sector tends to raise the stability of the deposit and loan basis. This is given by the negative

11

12

Kutner, M. H.; Nachtsheim, C. J.; Neter, J. (2004). Applied Linear Regression Models (4th ed.). McGraw-Hill Irwin.
Sheather, Simon (2009). A modern approach to regression with R. New York, NY: Springer.

relationship between credit risk and "borrowing from a financial institution or credit card in labor
force". However, it is worth to mention that not all income groups should be financially included
illustrated in the difference between those in and out of labor force. This is illustrated in the
positive relationship between credit risk and "borrowing from financial institutions or by credit
cards out of the labor force". Given the negative relationship between credit risk variable and
"borrowing from a financial institution or a credit card in labor force". This outcome concurs the
argument of Lopez and Winkler (2019) that more inclusive banking sector are likely to record
decreases in credit and borrowers' growth in times of crisis.
The results also support Berger and Bouwman's (2009) financial fragility-crowding out
hypothesis and risk absorption hypothesis in the sense of, the higher the liquidity being created
due to the demand on cash and withdrawals the more banks are prone to risks. This could be
demonstrated in the positive relationship between the credit risk variable and "debit card
ownership variable". The positive relationship between the credit risk and "the debit card
ownership" justifies the outcome of the research conducted by Castellanos, Henrnandez,
Mahajan, and Sierra (2018), whereas providing credit cards to "new to bank" borrowers results in
substantial risk. This is linked to debit cards as the issuance of credit cards is collateralized
against a saving account associated with a debit card. It also supports the argument of Awad and
Eid (2018) on the redistribution of credit towards new borrowers' segments comes with a cost at
the account of financial intermediary efficiency illustrated in high screening and information
costs.
The impact of credit risk due to the emergence of financial inclusion on the chosen sample of
countries could be justified through several hypotheses mentioned in the literature review. The
increase in credit risk in countries could be associated with Kjosevski and Petkovski's (2016)
argument on the variation of the NPL due to the negative correlation with GDP. Moreover, the
inflation rate has demonstrated a negative correlation with the NPL, while the lending interest
rate has demonstrated a positive correlation with NPL, the same case for unemployment. The
empirical analysis on countries effect can be further explained by Bhattarai (2017), that NPL
could be altered by banks' performance metrics such as ROE, bank efficiency and loans
categories. Furthermore, the increasing credit risk could be justified by Pearce (2011) that

financial inclusion in the MENA region faces deficiencies in the financial infrastructure and
regulations that enforce it. This makes increasing access to finance riskier and costlier for banks.
3.2-3 Part Three: The Results for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion and
Longevity Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk
Table (7): Model Summary for the for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion and
Longevity Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524)
b

Model Summary

Std. Error
Adjusted
of the
DurbinModel
R
R Square R Square
Estimate
Watson
a
1
.290
.084
.072 .00817264
1.091
a. Predictors: (Constant), long6, Debitcardownershipage15,
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardinlaborforceag, long3,
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionage15,
Savedatafinancialinstitutionage15,
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardoutoflaborforc
b. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans

Table (8): ANOVA table for the for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion and
Longevity Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524)
a

ANOVA
Model
1 Regression
Residual

Sum of
Squares
.003
.034

7

Mean
Square
0.00045

516

0.00007

Df

F
6.761

Sig.
b
.000

Total

.038
523
a. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans
b. Predictors: (Constant), long6, Debitcardownershipage15,
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardinlaborforceag, long3,
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionage15, Savedatafinancialinstitutionage15,
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardoutoflaborforc

Table (9): The effect of the Indicators of Financial Inclusion and Longevity Effects on
Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524)
Coefficients

Model

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error

a

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

Collinearity Statistics
t

Sig.

Tolerance

VIF

1

(Constant)

0.00896

0.00054

16.48835

0.00000

-0.036

0.02236

-0.16648

-1.64356

0.09088

0.17301

5.77993

Debit card ownership
age15

0.010

0.00259

0.23488

4.03779

0.00006

0.52459

1.90624

Borrowed from a
financial institution
age15

0.066

0.06565

0.09960

1.00996

0.031299

0.18253

5.47869

Borrowed from a
financial institution or
used a credit card in
labor force

-0.040

0.01511

-0.97026

-2.71153

0.00692

0.01386

72.12825

Borrowed from a
financial institution or
used a credit card out
of labor force

0.171

0.07283

0.84146

2.35205

0.01905

0.01387

72.10018

-0.003

0.00098

-0.14834

-3.34071

0.00090

0.90027

1.11077

-0.000 0.00099
-0.02066
a. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans

-0.47386

0.63580

0.93396

1.07071

Saved at a financial
institution age15

long3
long6

Adding the dummy variables to control for the longevity effect, it is observed that the model has
improved given by the increase of the adjusted R squared from 5.5% in table (1) to 7.2% in table
(7). This is in addition to the decrease in the standard error from 0.0082 in table (1) to 0.0081 in
table (7). Moreover, 8.4% variability in credit risk is explained by all predictor variables
represented by the financial inclusion indicators and longevity 3 effect. This is provided by the
measure of quality of fit R squared in table (7). The output from ANOVA table (8), proves that
the significance of the F test implies that the regression model is significant in predicting the
relationship between the financial inclusion indicators, longevity effect and credit risk. As for the
coefficient's table (9), it is resolved that longevity 3 is significant in this regression equation,
moreover, it is noticed that there is a negative relationship between the credit risk variable and
longevity 3 effect given by the negative coefficient. In other words, it will take the finance
inclusion at least 3 years to reduce the credit risk, which is a long term effect. Post adding the
longevity effect, two variables that weren't significant in table 3, became significant in table 9.
These variables are named "saving at financial institution" which has a significant negative

relationship with credit risk. Meaning if savings at financial institution increased, it will decrease
credit risk by 0.036. The other variable is "borrowed from financial institution" which has
significant positive relationship with credit risk. Meaning that if borrowings from financing
institutions increased, it will increase credit risk by 0.066.
It is also noted that the statistical analysis supports the stance of Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan
(2005), Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011), and Han and Melecky (2013) on measuring financial
inclusion by the wider access to and use of deposits which can improve banks' resilience in times
of financial traumas. This is given by the negative relationship between credit risk and saving at
financial institution variable. Furthermore, banks facing stock volatility, increased unusual loan
commitments, and liquidity risk exposure are alleviated by transaction deposits.
The empirical analysis argues for the sake of Ghenemi, Chaibi, and Omri (2017) on the
relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk on banks stability in the MENA region.
Moreover, the increased credit default works on increasing liquidity risk due to the lowered cash
inflows. We can perceive out of this analogy, that the increasing cash inflows as an outcome of
saving at financial institution can control the credit risk. The positive relationship of "borrowing
from financial institution" and credit risk supports the argument of Khan (2011), Merhotra and
Yetman (2015), Sahay et al (2015), and Berger and Bouwman (2009).
3.2-4 Part Four: The Results for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion, Country
Effects and Longevity Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk
Table (10): Model Summary for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion, Country
Effects and Longevity Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524)
b

Model Summary

Std. Error
Adjusted
of the
DurbinModel
R
R Square R Square
Estimate
Watson
a
1
.681
.464
.437 .00636537
1.472
a. Predictors: (Constant), Yemen, Libya, Djibouti, Oman, Qatar, Syria,
Morocco, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, long3, KSA, Malta, Tunisia, Jordan,
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardoutoflaborforc, long6,
Algeria, UAE, Egypt, Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionage15,
Debitcardownershipage15, Savedatafinancialinstitutionage15,
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardinlaborforceag, Israel
b. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans

Table (11): ANOVA table for the effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion, Country
Effects and Longevity Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524)
a

ANOVA
Model
1 Regression

Sum of
Squares
.017

Residual

.020

25

Mean
Square
0.00070

498

0.00004

df

F
17.225

Sig.
b
.000

Total
.038
523
a. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans
b. Predictors: (Constant), Yemen, Libya, Djibouti, Oman, Qatar, Syria, Morocco, Iraq,
Kuwait, Bahrain, long3, KSA, Malta, Tunisia, Jordan,
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardoutoflaborforc, long6, Algeria, UAE,
Egypt, Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionage15, Debitcardownershipage15,
Savedatafinancialinstitutionage15,
Borrowedfromafinancialinstitutionorusedacreditcardinlaborforceag, Israel

Table (12): The effects of Indicators of Financial Inclusion, Country Effects and Longevity
Effects on Banks’ Credit Risk (N = 524)
Coefficients

Model
1 (Constant)
Saved at a financial
institution age15
Debit card ownership
age15
Borrowed from a financial
institution age15

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
0.0042 0.0013

a

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

Collinearity
Statistics
t
3.1636

Sig.
0.0017

Tolerance

VIF

-0.0445

0.0430

-0.2016

-1.0350

0.3012

0.0284

5.2343

0.0078

0.0048

0.1762

1.6332

0.0931

0.0925

8.8085

0.1264

0.1191

0.1899

1.0612

0.2891

0.0336

9.7446

-0.0181

0.0402

-0.4286

-0.4503

0.0527

0.0012

1.2881

0.0605

0.2712

0.2972

0.2230

0.8236

0.0006

8.4350

Borrowed from a financial
institution or used a credit
card in labor force

Borrowed from a financial
institution or used a credit
card out of labor force

long3

-0.0039

0.0008

-0.1756

-4.8372

0.0000

0.8167

1.2244

long6

-0.0008

0.0008

-0.0354

-0.9978

0.3188

0.8534

1.1718

Algeria

0.0057

0.0016

0.1898

3.5522

0.0004

0.3772

2.6511

Bahrain

0.0018

0.0040

0.0440

0.4519

0.6515

0.1137

8.7944

Djibouti

0.0121

0.0039

0.1074

3.1001

0.0020

0.8969

1.1150

Egypt

0.0036

0.0015

0.1291

2.3446

0.0194

0.3550

2.8168

Iraq

0.0125

0.0020

0.2685

6.2509

0.0000

0.5834

1.7140

Israel

0.0034

0.0340

0.1135

0.1009

0.9196

0.0009

3.4067

Jordan

0.0084

0.0017

0.2256

4.9562

0.0000

0.5199

1.9234

KSA

0.0015

0.0020

0.0381

0.7608

0.4472

0.4298

2.3269

Kuwait

0.0070

0.0042

0.1584

1.6768

0.0942

0.1207

8.2869

Libya

0.0207

0.0039

0.1839

5.2837

0.0000

0.8890

1.1248

Malta

0.0054

0.0066

0.1362

0.8161

0.4148

0.0387

5.8489

Morocco

0.0055

0.0020

0.1153

2.7029

0.0071

0.5913

1.6912

Oman

-0.0012

0.0030

-0.0152

-0.4075

0.6838

0.7748

1.2907

Qatar

-0.0008

0.0026

-0.0110

-0.2896

0.7722

0.7531

1.3279

Syria

0.0154

0.0025

0.2366

6.0942

0.0000

0.7144

1.3997

Tunisia

0.0065

0.0017

0.1734

3.8595

0.0001

0.5333

1.8753

UAE

0.0074

0.0028

0.2773

2.6785

0.0076

0.1005

9.9524

0.0890 0.0065
a. Dependent Variable: ProvisionforloanlossesNetLoans

0.4584

13.6924

0.0000

0.9609

1.0407

Yemen

By adding countries' individual effect to the model, an obvious improvement in the model has
been noticed in table (10) given by the quality of fit the adjusted R squared which increased from
41.3% in table (4) to 43.7%. It is also observed the STD Error has decrease from 0.00650 to
0.00636 indicating model improvement. In other words, when the country effect has been added,
46.4% of the variability in credit risk is explained by financial indicators, countries' effect and
longevity effect combined. The F significance given by ANOVA table (11) states that the
regression model is significant in predicting the relationship between financial inclusion
indicators, longevity and countries' effect impact on the credit risk. Given the coefficient's table
(12), the thesis concludes that the countries the most affected by the credit risk caused by
financial inclusion which are Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco,
Syria, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen. The countries should direct their financial regulators to
accumulate enough reserves for loan losses for at least 3 years to mitigate for the credit risk
impact when initiating financial inclusive projects. After adding the countries' effect on the
financial inclusion indicators and the longevity effect, only "debit card ownership" and

"Borrowed from financial institutions or used a credit card in labor force" are significant in
predicting the relationship with credit risk. The reason why the significance became exclusive
only to these two variables is due to the changing conditions in the group of countries tested.
This can agree with the argument of with Kjosevski and Petkovski's (2016), Bhattarai (2017) and
Pearce (2011).

III. Summary
Summing up the provisions of the empirical analysis, the thesis has come to the conclusion that
the provision for loan losses to net loans as a proxy for credit risk is significant to some financial
inclusion indicators namely "Debit card ownership", "borrowed from financial institutions or
used a credit card in labour force" and "borrowed from financial institutions or used a credit card
out of labour force". Credit risk turns to have negative relationship with "borrowing from
financial institution through credit card in labour force". However, when accounting for the
longevity effect, all financial inclusion indicators became significant in predicting the
relationship with credit risk, where "saving at a financial institutions" and "borrowed from
financial institutions or used a credit card in labour force" have a negative relationship with
credit risk. Post the addition of countries' effect on the longevity effect and the financial
inclusion indicators, credit risk significance became exclusive to only "Debit card ownership"
affecting credit risk positively and "borrowed from financial institutions or used a credit card in
labour force" affecting credit risk negatively. Moreover, initiating financial inclusion through
formal financial institutions is likely to affect countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan,
Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen. In this respect, financial inclusion
will start to have a negative impact on credit risk in 3 years in the above economies which is a
long term effect.

Chapter Four
Conclusion and Recommendations
IV.a Conclusion
Financial inclusion is aimed at introducing the underserved segment of the community to the
official financial institutions. It is without doubt that financial inclusion is one of the sustainable
development goals to raise the poor's living standards by availing banking services that are not
limited to loan acquisition. In this respect, this study aims at testing the relationship between the
most used financial inclusion indicators and the ratio of the provision for loan losses to net loan
as a proxy for credit risk. Using the Least Square Dummy Variables (LSDV) as estimation
equation for non-linear model, it is found that borrowing from financial institutions or through
credit card in labor force affects credit risk negatively. Meanwhile debit card ownership affects
credit risk positively. Applying these results on the MENA region as the thesis's geographic
scope, the countries the most affected by credit risk as a result of financial inclusion programs
are Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen.
Moreover, post the addition of the longevity effect to the regression equation, these countries
need to accumulate enough reserve for loan losses for at least three years. In the light of having
two opposing teams in the literature, the thesis is more inclined towards the team supporting
financial inclusion as having a positive effect on banks' stability but on the long term.

IV.b Recommendations
In order to mitigate for the impact of credit risk when initiating financial inclusion programs,
governments are advised to approach microcredit program in a two tiered fashion, promoting
productive self-employment by delivering credit to the poor for the purchase of capital input. In
addition to the this, microcredit should deliver non-credit services such as social development
programs such as vocational trainings, civil responsibilities and rights, information in health
areas, and information sharing and monitoring among members. These non-credit services could
be understood in a more general context hence called, Business Development Services (BDS)
which creates valuable relationship between the borrowers and the financial institutions. In this
regards, Grameen bank model sets an example. In order to increase repayment rates and control

the risk of extending loans under financial inclusion, the design of credit programs for the poor
based on joint liability through peer selection, peer monitoring, and peer pressure are crucial to
enhance repayment rates. In addition to this, the efficiency of group dynamics that are shaped by
social ties and group homogeneity shall increase repayment performances. This is because social
ties tend to increase social sanctions of peer pressure. Microfinance institutions can generate high
repayment rates from the borrowers without the need for collaterals and group lending contracts.
This can be achieved by the threat to refinance a borrower who default on obligation. Another
tool could be to establish a collateral substitute that could act as an emergency fund. Regular
repayment schedule can sustain high repayment rates as it works on screening out borrowers that
are undisciplined at early stages and gives early warning for credit officers about future
problems.
Seeing the repercussions of information asymmetry and moral hazard that arise from the
extension of loans, credit bureaus could be the institutional answer to these problems.
Information sharing assists the lender in better judging the risk profile of a potential borrower
and provide incentives to have the borrower pay on time and narrowing the window for the
former to access credit from other lenders. In this light, Credit Reporting Agencies (CRA's) will
play a critical role in reducing information asymmetry and moral hazard by allowing more
suitable interest rates and reflecting the actual risk of the individual borrower. Banks are also
advised to alter their credit reporting regime by including full-file comprehensive reporting
rather than negative only reporting. The former is said to widens credit opportunities to the
private sector.
Credit Guarantee companies (CGC's) is considered to be a solution to enhance access to finance.
CGC's are able to provide guarantees for MSME's without collaterals or track records to seek
funding opportunities. They also cover a percentage of the risk besides their ability to remedy the
financing gap which distinguishes economies in transition from other economies, that is the lack
of usable collaterals. From a different perspective, financial inclusion and stability should be
treated in a nexus where they should be healed by synergies rather than trade-offs. While
financial openness instigates trade-offs between financial inclusion and stability, fiscal freedom,
education, and deepening the credit information system should generate synergies between
financial inclusion and stability.

One important factor that can contribute to the successful emergence of financial inclusion, is the
overhauling of financial infrastructure. This could occur by enforcing transaction laws and the
establishment of unified collateral registries. Moreover, it is recommended to remove interest
caps, which should happen in a way that should not overlap with the general local economy.
Furthermore, enhancing consumer protection against exploitative practices such as excessive
fees on overdraft, lack of consumer redress and the miss-sell of financial products.
Countries challenged by low financial inclusion could gain from Fintech lending. This end could
be achieved by deploying machine learning based credit rating that can bring significant
disruption in the credit market. In this light, Fintech can reduce the time for credit decision and
generate lower loan rates to existing borrowers.
The bank account information model could be deployed to improve default prediction. The
model will be able to reduce credits costs and review times, furthermore, it won't be manipulated
nor altered by the information provider for the purpose of tax returns or loan application. The
emergence of such model will allow bank to calculate the loan's upper limit and in addition of
having a grasp of the annual cash flow of the borrower, the bank will be able to make precise
estimates of the amount a borrower can repay.
For banks to control defaults rates, banks are advised to increase the minimum payment which
could reduce debt and further facilitating repayment burdens. However, policymakers will have
to be cautious as increasing the minimum payment may have a double edged effect. The
downside to this policy is that it tightens the short-run liquidity constrains which in its turn can
increase the default rates.

IV. c Future Research
In the light of the above, seeing that a lot of the micro-finance practices can be used to control
repayment rates and hence stabilize credit risk. The researcher shall further examine the impact
of these practices on controlling credit risk when initiating financial inclusion projects
empirically. Moreover, how these practices could be mainstreamed as part of the banks
operations to enhance their stability and advance financial inclusion in their different economies.
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